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Background: As the human infections with novel influenza A(H7N9) virus have been
reported from several different provinces in China, the pandemic potential of the
virus has been questioned. The presence of human-to-human transmission has not
been demonstrated, but the absence of demonstration does not guarantee that
there is no such transmission.
Methods: A mathematical model of cluster size distribution is devised without
imposing an assumption of subcriticality of the reproduction number and
accounting for right censoring of new clusters. The proportion of cases with a history
of bird contact is analytically derived, permitting us to fit the model to the observed
data of confirmed cases. Using contact history with bird among confirmed cases
(n = 129), we estimate the reproduction number of the novel influenza A(H7N9) from
human to human.
Results: Analysing twenty confirmed cases with known exposure, the reproduction
number for human-to-human transmission was estimated at 0.28 (95% CI: 0.11, 0.45).
Sensitivity analysis indicated that the reproduction number is substantially below unity.
Conclusions: It is unlikely to observe an immediate pandemic of novel influenza A
(H7N9) virus with human to human transmission. Continued monitoring of cases and
animals would be the key to elucidate additional epidemiological characteristics of
the virus.Background
As the human infections with novel influenza A(H7N9) virus have been reported from
several different provinces in eastern China [1], scientists, public health experts and all
others concerned including the general public have started to question the pandemic
potential of the virus [2]. The question largely owes to the fact that a high transmission
potential could indicate a high risk of forthcoming pandemic. While the direct link
between animal and human has yet to be established [3,4], the preliminary genetic
analysis of the virus, the virus isolation from poultry, pigeon and quail, and the pres-
ence of a contact history with bird among a part of confirmed cases imply that a part
of cases were caused by bird-to-human transmission [3-7]. Otherwise, the sources of
infection have yet to be fully clarified and confirmed cases from one province have not
been linked to those from other provinces [4].© 2013 Nishiura et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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cases have not been diagnosed as infected with the virus. Thus, the presence of
human-to-human transmission has not been demonstrated, but the absence of demon-
stration does not guarantee that there is no such transmission. In fact, there have been
two family clusters reported [4]. Given that a majority of confirmed cases have been
severe with unknown sources of infection and with reports from several different
provinces [1,4], and considering that the confirmed cases may represent only a part of
infections, it is natural to doubt if many infections are undiagnosed and if an unrecog-
nised epidemic is going on involving frequent transmissions from human to human in
the affected geographic locations.
Full clarification of the transmission potential requires additional case data and
information including the results from epidemiological investigation of traced contacts
[8]. However, we believe that publicly available data of the limited number of confirmed
cases, coupled with the latest information of the history of contact with bird among the
cases [8], have already informed us with a key insight into the transmissibility. This
study aims to demonstrate that the currently available confirmed case data with a
history of contact with bird can indicate that the transmission potential of the novel
influenza A(H7N9) may be limited.Methods
Case data
We analysed the confirmed case data reported by the Chinese government [9] and
World Health Organization (WHO) [1]. As of 1 May 2013, a total of 129 confirmed
cases including twenty four deaths have been reported from different administrative
regions (provinces and cities) and Taiwan. Although frequent reports of confirmed
cases took place from 31 March to the first half of April 2013, the temporal distribution
of cases by date of illness onset may give a slightly different impression (Figure 1A).
That is, more than 9 weeks have passed since the illness onset of the index case on 19
February 2013. Moreover, the frequency of illness onset has been diffuse in early
March, although it has become more frequent to observe cases on and after 19 March
2013 than before. Other than the date of illness onset, individual case information has
been accompanied by age, gender, geographic location (province or city), current clin-
ical status (or prognosis if already known), the date of diagnosis and the presence of
contact with animals including birds. Of the 129 cases, 17 have been publicly known to
have had an exposure to bird, three have been known not exposed, and otherwise, the
bird contact among other confirmed cases have publicly remained unknown including
those under investigation. In the latest preliminary epidemiological investigation of 82
cases including 77 cases with known contact, 59 (76.6%) were revealed to have been
exposed to poultry (n = 45), duck (n = 12), pigeon (n = 8) and swine (n = 4) [8]. We
utilise the contact information to estimate the transmissibility.Mathematical model
Figure 1B shows the transmission tree that classifies cases into those caused by bird-to-
human transmission and human-to-human transmission. If the human-to-human
transmission potential is high yielding substantial number of human secondary, tertiary
Figure 1 Temporal distribution and transmission tree of the novel influenza A(H7N9). A. Temporal
distribution of confirmed cases according to the date of illness onset by history of contact with birds
(n = 109 with known date of illness onset as of 1 May 2013; the dates of illness onset for other 20
confirmed cases have not been known including 1 asymptomatic infected with a history of contact with
bird). Cases with a known history of contact with bird are highlighted in dark grey, while cases without
contact are in white. B. The transmission tree that classifies cases into those caused by bird-to-human
transmission (grey) and human-to-human transmission (white). A virus with substantial human-to-human
transmission potential could yield many subsequent generations of cases caused by
human-to-human transmission.
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contact among all cases should increase and approach to 100%. Here we build a
mathematical model that describes this observation.
Let k be the number of infections caused by bird-to-human transmission. Only a part
of k are diagnosed and reported as confirmed cases. Let R be the reproduction number
of human-to-human transmission, representing the average number of secondary cases
caused by a single primary human case during his/her entire course of infection. If R is
above unity, the pandemic could occur with a certain probability. The possible number
of generations of cases due to human-to-human transmission is denoted by n, and let
fn be the probability mass function of the generations that each case with a history of
bird contact could have already generated. We assume that fn follows a geometric
distribution, because we assume an increasing trend in the number of primary cases
with bird contact as a function of time in Figure 1A and we would like to parameterize
it as a linear (exponential) growth using only one parameter while modelling it in
discrete unit of time (i.e. by generation of cases). We also assume that confirmed cases
with a history of bird contact developed illness proportionally to the total infected
individuals caused by bird-to-human transmission (so that we can estimate the para-
meter p of the geometric distribution, fn = (1-p)
np based on the time-dependent growth
of confirmed cases with a history of bird contact). Due to geometric series of cases











while the total number of infections caused by bird-to-human transmission (Chb) is k.
Assuming that the process of confirmatory diagnosis is independent of the source of
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http://www.tbiomed.com/content/10/1/30infection (i.e. the proportion of confirmed cases with a history of bird contact among
all confirmed cases is identical to that among all infected individuals), the probability of


















If the cases with a history of bird contact are α times less likely to be confirmed thancases with human-to-human transmission (e.g. due to an increased likelihood to
identify contacts during outbreak investigation [12]), the probability qhb that accounts



















where α < 1. Suppose that there are i cases who had a contact with bird and j who had
not, and that the elapsed number of generations ni is known for each primary case i
with a history of bird contact, the likelihood function is




where i0 represents the total number of cases with known bird contact and ni was
calculated from the data as the floor (or the largest previous integer) of the difference
between the date of illness onset of primary case with bird contact and the latest
possible time to observe illness onset (27 April 2013) followed by the division by the
mean generation time. The binomial sampling process of cases arising from a history of
contact with animal reservoir was similarly modelled in a recent study of swine
influenza, restricted to the case of R < 1 [9]. The maximum likelihood estimates of R
and p were obtained by minimizing the negative logarithm of equation (4). The 95%
confidence intervals (CI) were derived from the profile likelihood which exploits a
likelihood-ratio test to measure the uncertainty bound.
We examined two scenarios as our baseline. As of 1 May 2013, it is known that there
have been i = 17 confirmed cases with a history of contact with bird. Among other 112
confirmed cases, only 3 have been known not exposed. Our first scenario uses only the
cases with known exposure (n = 20), namely i = 17 and j = 3 as the baseline of the first
scenario. This scenario strictly adheres to the only available exposure information to
assess the transmissibility from human to human. Since i = 17 may have included those
not acquiring infection from bird (as they include severe cases), and because 3 cases
without contact history might not have simply noticed the contact, we varied i from 10
to 19 as part of sensitivity analysis. In the second scenario, we set i = 99 and j = 30 as
our baseline. This corresponds to the reported proportion of cases with bird contact
[8], and the uncertainty may range from 67.1% to 86.1%. Some of j = 30 cases without
contact information may later be revealed to have been actually exposed (e.g. without
realising the exposure) [13]. Thus, we again varied i from 86 to 111 (which corresponds
to the uncertainty bound in recent epidemiological investigation [8]).
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scenarios, while alternative scenarios should scale down α below 1. We examined the
reproduction number with α < 1. To calculate ni in the likelihood function (4), we
assumed that the generation time of human-to-human transmission is a constant with
the mean of 3 days [14]. As part of sensitivity analysis, we also examined R by varying
the mean generation time from 2 to 4 days.Results
Figure 2 shows the estimates of the reproduction number for human-to-human
transmission of the novel influenza A(H7N9). Based on confirmed cases with known
contact with bird, the mean number of generations that may have already elapsed was
estimated at 8.0 (95% CI: 4.6, 15.4) using the mean generation time of 3 days. The
mean number of generations of cases already elapsed was estimated at 12.1 and 5.8 by
using different mean generation time of 2 and 4 days, respectively.
Using only 20 known exposures in the first scenario, the reproduction number was
estimated to be 0.28 (95% CI: 0.11, 0.45). The upper confidence intervals were well
below unity for the examined scenarios. With α < 1, the reproduction number appears
to be even smaller (Results not shown). Figure 2B examines the sensitivity of the
reproduction number to the mean generation time. If the generation time is longer, the
reproduction number is estimated as bigger.
Figure 2C and 2D show the estimates of the reproduction number in our second
scenario. In the worst case scenario with i = 99 and j = 30, the reproduction number
was estimated at 0.36 (95% CI: 0.33, 0.40). If more bird contacts are revealed in future,
the reproduction number is estimated to be smaller (Figure 2C). For instance, if 6 more
cases are revealed to have been exposed to poultry, the maximum likelihood estimate
of R is 0.31.Discussion
We have demonstrated that the proportion of confirmed cases with a history of bird
contact can inform the magnitude of the transmission potential, showing that the
reproduction number for human-to-human transmission of the novel influenza A
(H7N9) is well below unity. Our finding is consistent with the lack of demonstration of
human-to-human transmission among traced contacts of confirmed cases. Since the
absence of secondary transmission during contact tracing practice can only indicate
that the human transmission may be limited (because the quantitative objectiveness of
traced “contact” is limited), our finding of R < 1 is significant in that it can quantita-
tively imply that it is unlikely to observe an immediate pandemic with substantial
transmissions from human to human.
Our modelling exercise emphasises that a high proportion of cases with a history of
bird contact among all cases is regarded as good news (to anticipate the pandemic). If a
pandemic is very likely, cases caused by human-to-human transmission should become
widespread in a short period of time, and cases with bird contact may not be even
visible among the total number of confirmed cases (e.g. recall the confirmed case data
of influenza A(H1N1-2009) which was filled with those caused by human-to-human
transmission even during the early stage). As examined earlier for a different influenza
Figure 2 The estimated reproduction number of human-to-human transmission for the novel
influenza A(H7N9). Each line shows the estimated reproduction number of human-to-human transmission
for novel influenza A(H7N9). If the reproduction number exceeds 1, it indicates that a pandemic in human
population can be caused with a certain probability. Our estimates depend on the proportion of cases
caused by bird-to-human transmissions among a total of confirmed cases, and thus, the actual number of
confirmed cases with bird contact. As of 1 May 2013, seventeen cases have been reported to have had
contact with bird. Panels A and B show the results from the first scenario in which we analysed only the
cases with a known history of exposure (i.e. 17 contacts with bird and 3 cases without bird contact). Panels
C and D show the results from the second scenario, which adhered to the latest contact tracing
information [8], considering that 99 out of 129 confirmed cases had a history of exposure to bird. Panels A
and C additionally show the 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines, while panels B and D vary the mean
generation time from 2 to 4 days (baseline: 3 days). In all panels, solid line represents the maximum
likelihood estimates of the reproduction number for human-to-human transmission for the baseline
scenario. The horizontal grey line corresponds to the reproduction number at unity above which a
pandemic could occur. An arrow in each panel on the horizontal axis points the baseline assumption of the
number of contacts with bird.
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contact can be explicitly translated to an estimate of R. Among published studies of the
transmissibility of avian and swine influenza in humans [12,15-18], only Cauchemez
et al. [12] utilised the information of the number of reservoir-borne transmission
among all cases to estimate the transmissibility. While Cauchemez et al. [12] examined
the similar data without censoring and specifically for a subscritical process (i.e. under
an assumption of R < 1) with the mean cluster size of 1/(1-R), the present study further
accounted for right censoring of the clusters of cases (and also the right censoring of
the contact investigation result) without imposing an assumption of subcriticality (i.e. R
can take the value either below or above unity depending on the data). For public
health practice, Cauchemez et al. [12] and our modelling exercise suggest that the
traced information of contact with animals would be critical in epidemiological
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population. An updated news of exposure to poultry among a substantial fraction of
cases [8] indicates that the exposure to poultry has been very likely underreported in
real time (i.e. during the course of an outbreak). To yield additional insights into the
epidemiological characteristics, the animal contact should be explored more in detail
and routinely reported in a timely manner, including the time and place of contact as
well as detailed species of animals.
Our finding of R < 1 indicates that the continued monitoring of cases in future is even
more important than in the past, because the majority of cases may have been exposed
to bird without realising the exposure. Identifying the exact sources of infection that
have successfully generated the spatially diffuse outbreak would be the key to bring the
ongoing outbreak under control. In this context, routine surveillance and monitoring
of animal influenza including those conducted at poultry market are recommended to
help elucidating the transmission dynamics [19].
Three limitations should be noted. First, except for ascertainment bias, we assumed
that the proportion of bird contact among confirmed cases mirrors that of all infected
individuals. Our analysis assumed that exposure to poultry among confirmed cases is a
good proxy for actual bird-to-human infection; our estimates of R may be biased if this
assumption is violated. Second, our model rested on simple homogeneous mixing
assumption to gain some gut feeling of the transmissibility (e.g. below or above unity)
based on limited confirmed case data. The proposed simple model ignored a
well-known variation in the number of secondary cases at an individual level (i.e. the
variance of the offspring distribution), which could have led our CI to be unrealistically
narrow [20,21]. Third, as was indicated by Cauchemez et al. [12], the estimate of the
reproduction number using the fraction of cases with a history of reservoir contact
may be biased upward if some cases are detected through outbreak investigation. That
is, our estimate of R derived from 20 cases with known contact may have been even an
overestimate, because human-to-human transmissions are more likely to be detected
than bird-to-human transmissions during contact tracing practice. This point supports
our main conclusion of R < 1.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present study has successfully extracted
the information of transmissibility. It is unlikely that the pandemic will occur immediately,
but continued monitoring of cases and animals would be the key to elucidate additional
epidemiological characteristics of the novel influenza A(H7N9) virus.Conclusions
We proposed a mathematical model of cluster size distribution of influenza without
imposing an assumption of subcriticality accounting for right censoring of new clusters
of cases. Using contact history with bird among confirmed cases (n = 129), we estimate
the reproduction number of the novel influenza A(H7N9) from human to human.
Analysing twenty confirmed cases with known exposure, the reproduction number for
human-to-human transmission was estimated at 0.28 (95% CI: 0.11, 0.45). Sensitivity
analysis indicated that the reproduction number is substantially below unity. It is
unlikely to observe an immediate pandemic of novel influenza A(H7N9) virus with
substantial human-to-human transmissions.
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